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We discuss the ring based public-key cryptosystem known as non-commutative
NTRU. The original system is defined over the group ring R = Z[DN ] (where
DN is the dihedral group of order 2N) and uses a commutative subring R0 =
{α ∈ R|Y α = αY } where Y is an element of order two for DN . This system
was broken by Coppersmith in [1]. To do this he uses properties of the subset
R1 = {α ∈ R | Y α = −αY }. He is able to create a ’fake’ private key using R1
and R0. This ’fake’ private key then allows him to create a map θ : R→ R that
is used to break the system.
The present discussion first analyzes the original system and the attack on
the system. We also determine what groups the original system can be defined
over, and therefore when Coppersmith’s attack will work. Second we extend
this system to other group rings. The groups have two generators that do not
commute, but the generators will have prime orders larger than two. We still
work with the ring Z[G] and the subring of elements that commute with Y , the
generator with smaller order. We then extend the attack on the system. This
is where the key difference arises. We develop the representation theory of these
more general groups so that we can break the system. Also to break the system
we need to look at subsets of Z[G] where conjugation by Y (of order k) multiplies
the elements by a kth root of unity. We denote these subsets by R1, R2, . . . , Rk−1.
One of the main results is to show that these Rj are principal R0 modules. This
allows us to define a similar θ. Since a primitive kth root of unity does not always
exist modulo q it is necessary to work in an extension ring to break the system
in some cases. But when θ is created it maps into the original group ring, which
allows us to break the system. Finally we give a few examples.
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Public-key cryptography was introduced around forty years ago. It allows the
users to communicate over non-secure channels without any prior communication.
They do this by publishing one public key for encryption and using another
private key for decryption. RSA[14] is probably the most famous public-key
cryptosystem, but there are many others: ElGamal [3, 4], McEliece [11, 12], and
commutative NTRU [8]. These are all commutative systems. There are also non-
commutative systems such as a braid group system [10] and non-commutative
NTRU [6, 1]. Our purpose is to further investigate non-commutative NTRU. We
will analyze Coppersmith’s attack [1] on the original system. We will also show
that its original implementation can be extended and broken.
For a public-key cryptosystem, assume that Alice wants to send a message to
Bob. Bob first publishes a public key and has another private key. Alice uses this
public key to encrypt a message and send it to Bob. Bob then uses his private
key to decrypt the message. Note that not only Alice can use Bob’s public key,
but also anyone who wants to send Bob a message can use his public key to do
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so. In general, Bob creates his public key from his private key and it is hard for
someone to find the private key from the public key.
Non-commutative NTRU is a ring based public-key cryptosystem. The origi-
nal system is defined over the group ring R = Z[DN ] (where DN is the dihedral
group of order 2N) and uses a commutative subring R0 = {α ∈ R | Y α = αY }
where Y is an element of order two for DN . This system was broken by Copper-
smith in [1]. To do this he uses properties of the subset R1 = {α ∈ R | Y α =
−αY }. He is able to create a ‘fake’ private key using R1 and R0. This ‘fake’
private key then allows him to create a map θ : R→ R that is used to break the
system.
In Sections 1.2 and 1.3 we analyze the original system and the attack on
the system. Next in subsection 1.3.1 we determine what groups the original
system can be defined over, and when Coppersmith’s attack will work. Then in
Section 2.1 we extend this system to other group rings. The groups still have
two generators that do not commute, but the generators have prime orders larger
than two. We still work with the ring Z[G] and the subring of elements that
commute with Y , the generator with smaller order. We extend the attack to this
generalization of the system in Section 2.3. This is where the key difference arises.
Coppersmith’s attack only works for Z[DN ] and closely related group rings. In
Section 2.2 we develop the representation theory of these more general groups
that is necessary to break the system. Also to break the system we need to look
at subsets R1, R2, . . . , Rk−1 of Z[G], where Ri = {α ∈ R | Y α = zikαY } and zk
is a primitive kth root of unity. One of the main results is Theorem 2.3.10 which
shows that these Ri are principal R0 modules. Finally in Sections 2.4, 2.5, and
2.6 we define a θ to break the system. In Section 2.7 we give a few examples.
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1.2 Description of Non-commutative NTRU
Non-commutative NTRU is a public-key cryptosystem. It was originally de-
scribed in a manuscript by Hoffstein and Silverman [6], but the present descrip-
tion comes from a paper by Coppersmith[1]. The system uses the group ring
R = Z[DN ], where DN is the dihedral group of order 2N . Later we will define the
system using other rings, so we will call this RZ to reduce confusion, but through-
out this section it is not necessary. We can also think of this as a ‘polynomial’ ring
with non-commutative variables R = Z[X, Y ]/(XN − 1, Y 2 − 1, Y X −XN−1Y ).
(This is somewhat an abuse of notation since it is normally reserved for com-
mutative polynomial rings.) Multiplication in R will be denoted by f ∗ g or fg.
Also, we need a commutative subring, R0, consisting of all elements in R that
commute with Y . In other words,









i +XN−i)Y | ai, bi ∈ Z}.
The system also involves integer parameters p, q, r, s, and t with p, r, and t
small (on the order of 3 or 5) and q and s large (N is usually chosen to be
somewhat large, but smaller than q.) The parameters are large to mask part of the
message, or small so that when we encrypt and decrypt the message ‘wrapping’
modulo q does not occur. We need the assumption that p and q are prime and
are relatively prime to 2N (otherwise the system will break down). For example
Coppersmith gives the following choices of parameters in [1]:
N = 263, p = 3, q = 125003, r = 5, s = 90000, t = 3
To set up the system we look at R and R0 with restricted coefficients. We
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denote these subsets as















Assume Alice wants to send a message to Bob. To start Bob must choose his
private and public keys. First he chooses a random f ∈ Sf and ω ∈ Sω. Next
he computes F ∈ R0 such that f ∗ F ≡ 1 (mod q). (Please see Section 2.6 for
when such an F exists.) Bob’s public key is then h = pF ∗ω ∗ f (mod q) and the
private keys are f, F , and ω. Suppose Alice wants to send the message m ∈ Sm.
To encrypt m she first randomly chooses φ, φ′ ∈ Sφ and ψ ∈ Sψ and computes
Ψ ∈ R0{p} such that Ψ ≡ ψ (mod p). She then computes the pair (e, E) with
e ≡ φ ∗ h ∗ φ′ + ψ (mod q)
E ≡ Ψ ∗ h+m (mod q)
and sends the pair to Bob.
To decrypt the message Bob computes
a ≡ f ∗ e ∗ F ≡ pφ ∗ ω ∗ φ′ + ψ (mod q)
and then reduces this modulo p to recover Ψ ≡ ψ (mod p). Now Bob can subtract
Ψ ∗ h (mod q) from E to obtain m.
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Example 1.2.1. Let N = 7, q = 101, p = r = t = 3, and s = 50. Bob makes the
following choices:
f = −3 + 5(X +X6) + 2(X2 +X5)− (X3 +X4)
+ 2Y − 3(X +X6)Y − 5(X2 +X5)Y + (X3 +X4)Y
ω = −1 +X2 −X3 +X4 +X6 − Y +X2Y −X3Y +X4Y +X5Y
and computes the following:
F = f−1
= −39 + 30(X +X6)− 37(X2 +X5) + 12(X3 +X4)
+ 3Y − 32(X +X6)Y − 9(X2 +X5)Y + 37(X3 +X4)Y
h = Fωf
= −3− 34X + 30X2 + 17X3 − 17X4 − 27X5 + 37X6
− 3Y + 25XY − 21X2Y − 34X3Y + 34X4Y + 27X5Y − 25X6Y
Bob now makes h public and keeps f, F, and ω private.
To send Bob a message Alice makes the following choices:
φ = (X +X6)− (X2 +X5) + (X3 +X4) + Y − (X3 +X4)Y
φ′ = 1 + (X2 +X5)− (X3 +X4) + (X +X6)Y + (X3 +X4)Y
ψ = −3(X +X6) + 2(X2 +X5) + 2(X3 +X4)
+ 4Y + 3(X +X6)Y − 3(X2 +X5)Y + 4(X3 +X4)Y
She reduces ψ modulo p to get Ψ = −(X2 +X5)− (X3 +X4) + Y + (X3 +X4)Y
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and then computes the following:
e = φhφ′ + ψ
= 15− 10X + 34X2 + 26X3 − 7X4 − 9X5 − 32X6
− 2Y + 43XY − 30X2Y + 46X3Y − 14X4Y − 6X5Y − 10X6Y
E = Ψh+m
= −4− 20X − 13X2 − 34X3 + 26X4 + 19X5 + 22X6
− 11Y + 22XY + 7X2Y + 24X3Y − 25X4Y + 2X5Y − 24X6Y
using her message
m = 2 + 5X − 4X2 +X3 − 2X5 − 3X6 − 2Y +XY − 3X3Y + 5X4Y − 3X6Y.
She now sends the pair (e, E) to Bob.
Bob uses his private keys to compute:
a = feF
= 15− 12X + 8X2 + 20X3 − 1X4 + 17X5 − 30X6
− 2Y + 12XY − 12X2Y + 22X3Y + 10X4Y − 24X5Y + 21X6Y
which he then reduces modulo p to get ap = −X2−X3−X4−X5+Y +X3Y +X4Y .
Next Bob computes:
E−hap = 2+5X−4X2 +X3−2X5 +3X6−2Y +XY −3X3Y +5X4Y −3X6Y
which is the message that Alice sent.
6
1.3 Coppersmith’s Attack
In [1], Coppersmith described a method of attacking this cryptosystem. Copper-
smith’s attack allows a third party to decrypt a message without any knowledge
of the private key. For the attack it is necessary to consider the subset R1 of R
defined by:











∣∣∣∣∣∣ ai, bi ∈ Z
 .
Recall that to decrypt the message Bob used f and F to create a linear map that
took the ciphertext e (mod q) to the quantity a (mod q). But it is not actually
necessary to know f and F to create a suitable linear map. It is enough to create
a linear map
θ : R (mod q) → R (mod q)
with the following properties:
• θ is the identity on R0 (mod q)
• θ maps R1 (mod q) to itself
• θ is left and right R0 linear
• θ(h) is a multiple of p and ω′ = θ(h)/p has small coefficients modulo q.
Such a θ gives us Ψ since
θ(e) ≡ θ(φ ∗ h ∗ φ′ + ψ) (mod q)
≡ φ ∗ θ(h) ∗ φ′ + ψ (mod q) since θ is R0 linear
≡ φ ∗ pω′ ∗ φ′ + ψ (mod q)
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which reduces to Ψ modulo p since ω′ is small (so that no wrapping occurs).
Note that the function θ′(α) = f ∗ α ∗ F is such a θ and is used by Bob to
decrypt the message. We construct a θ without knowing f , F , and ω. To do this















Also we know that
h+ Y hY ≡ pF ∗ ω ∗ f + Y (pF ∗ ω ∗ f)Y
≡ pF (ω + Y ωY )f
≡ p(ω + Y ωY ) (mod q),
since ω + Y ωY ∈ R0, so that f and F commute with it. Now we have









where ci, di ∈ {−p(t− 1),−p(t− 2), . . . , 0, p, 2p, . . . , p(t− 1)} since if we use the
labels for the coefficients of ω given above then we have ci = p(ai + aN−i) and
di = p(bi + bN−i).
To attack the system we must choose an ω′ ∈ Sω that is ‘small enough’. We













if ci = (2k + 1)p then a
′
i = k + 1 and a
′
N−i = k





if di = (2k + 1)p then b
′
i = k and b
′
N−i = k + 1
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It is now clear that ω′ satisfies
h+ Y hY ≡ p(ω′ + Y ω′Y ) (mod q)
and that it has small coefficients (on the order of ω’s coefficients).
Now we can define θ(h) = pω′ and define θ to have the other properties de-
scribed above to break the system. To get θ we use linear algebra techniques and
as long as h is invertible modulo q we can solve for θ. So we need to understand
when h will be invertible. We will do this in Section 2.6.
We will continue with the previous example.
Example 1.3.1. Let N = 7, q = 101, p = r = t = 3, s = 50, and
h =− 3− 34X + 30X2 + 17X3 − 17X4 − 27X5 + 37X6
− 3Y + 25XY − 21X2Y − 34X3Y + 34X4Y + 27X5Y − 25X6Y
e = 15− 10X + 34X2 + 26X3 − 7X4 − 9X5 − 32X6
− 2Y + 43XY − 30X2Y + 46X3Y − 14X4Y − 6X5Y − 10X6Y
E =− 4− 20X − 13X2 − 34X3 + 26X4 + 19X5 + 22X6
− 11Y + 22XY + 7X2Y + 24X3Y − 25X4Y + 2X5Y − 24X6Y
We compute
h+ Y hY = p(ω + Y ωY )
= −6 + 3(X +X6) + 3(X2 +X5)− 6Y + 6(X2 +X5)Y
= 3(−2 + (X +X6) + (X2 +X5)− 2Y + 2(X2 +X5)Y )
So ω′ = −1+X +X2−Y +X2Y +X5Y Now it is necessary to break both h and
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pω′ into their R0 and R1 parts. So we get the following:
h0 = −3− 49(X +X6)− 49(X2 +X5)
− 3Y + 3(X2 +X5)Y
h1 = 15(X −X6)− 22(X2 −X5) + 17(X3 −X4)
+ 25(X −X6)Y − 24(X2 −X5)Y − 34(X3 −X4)Y
ω′0 = h0
ω′1 = −49(X −X6)− 49(X2 −X5)
Where ω′0 + ω
′
1 = pω
′ Next we note that (X − X6) will generate R1 as an R0
module, since
(X −X6)(X +X6) = X2 −X5
(X −X6)(X2 +X5) = −X +X6 +X3 −X4 and
(X −X6)(X3 +X4) = −X2 +X5 −X3 +X4
so
X −X6 = (X −X6) ∗ 1
X2 −X5 = (X −X6) ∗ (X +X6) and
X3 −X4 = (X −X6) ∗ (1 + (X2 +X5)).
Now we can rewrite h1 and w1 as the following:
h1 = (X −X6)(15− 22(X +X6) + 17(X2 +X5 + 1))
+ (X −X6)(25− 24(X +X6)− 34(X2 +X5 + 1))Y
w1 = (X −X6)(−49− 49(X +X6))
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This reduces our work to solving
θ(X −X6)
(
(15− 22(X +X6) + 17(X2 +X5 + 1)
+ (25− 24(X +X6)− 34(X2 +X5 + 1))Y
)
= (X −X6)(−49− 49(X +X6))
but θ(X −X6) is an element of R1 so it must have the form
(X −X6) ∗ (a+ a0(X +X6) + a1(X2 +X5) + a2(X3 +X4))
+(X −X6) ∗ (b+ b0(X +X6) + b1(X2 +X5) + b2(X3 +X4)) ∗ Y.
Let
r0 = a+ a0(X +X
6) + a1(X




2 +X5) + b2(X
3 +X4))Y,
then we need only solve
(X −X6)r0
(
(15− 22(X +X6) + 17(X2 +X5 + 1)
+ (25− 24(X +X6)− 34(X2 +X5 + 1))Y
)
= (X −X6)(−49− 49(X +X6))
for r0. Using Maple (version 9.5) and Magma (version 2-11.14) we find that
r0 = 10 + 3(X +X
6) + 7(X2 +X5) + 41(X3 +X4)
− 5Y − 6(X +X6)Y − 36(X3 +X4)Y
Now we can define the following:
θ(X −X6) = (X −X6)r0,
θ(X2 −X5) = (X −X6)(X +X6)r0, and
θ(X3 −X4) = (X −X6)(X2 +X5 + 1)r0.
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To break the system we need to find θ(e). To do this we break e into its R0 and
R1 parts and get
e0 = 15− 21(X +X6)− 38(X2 +X5)− 41(X3 +X4)
− 2Y − 34(X +X6)Y − 18(X2 +X5)Y + 16(X3 +X4)Y
e1 = 11(X −X6)− 29(X2 −X5)− 34(X3 −X4)
− 24(X −X6)Y − 12(X2 −X5)Y + 30(X3 −X4)Y.
So θ(e) reduces to
θ(e) = e0 + θ(e1)
= 15− 21X + 14X2 + 14X3 + 5X4 + 11X5 − 21X6
+ (−2 + 9X + 27X2 + 10X3 + 22X4 − 9X5 + 24X6)Y
Reducing this modulo p = 3 we get −(X2 +X5)− (X3 +X4) + (1+ (X3 +X4))Y
which should be ψ modulo p. Using this and h we compute
E − h ∗ (−(X2 +X5)− (X3 +X4) + (1 + (X3 +X4))Y )
≡ 2 + 5X − 4X2 +X3 − 2X5 − 3X6 − 2Y +XY
− 3X3Y + 5X4Y − 3X6Y (mod q),
which is the message m.
1.3.1 Why this works only for DN
To attack this system we need to be able to create θ. Using θ to break the
system relies on the fact that ω is small (which is necessary for the system to
work). It also requires us to understand the structure of R0 and R1 and the fact
that p(ω + Y ωY ) = h+ Y hY to create ω′. We use two main facts:
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• Y has order two,
• and R0 = {α ∈ R|Y α = αY } is commutative
Our goal is to show that given these necessary assumptions we can conclude that
the group is something close to DN .
We will use representation theory to study when the set {α ∈ F [G] | Y α =
αY } is commutative for Y ∈ G. This allows us to determine under what condi-
tions we can set up the system given above. It is required that R0 is commutative
to decrypt the message (i.e. when Bob computes a ≡ f ∗ e ∗ F (mod q).)
Lemma 1.3.2. Let G be a finite group, and RF = F [G] for a ring F . Let Y ∈ G
and R0,F = {α ∈ RF | Y α = αY }. Then β =
∑
g∈G








where the outer sum is over representatives of the orbits
under conjugation by Y (Y -orbits) (i.e. elements of a particular Y -orbit all have
the same coefficient.)
Proof. If β =
∑
g∈G







agg. So aY gY −1 = ag for







. Clearly if β has the form given it
commutes with Y so it is in R0,F .
Proposition 1.3.3. Let G be a finite group, and RZ = Z[G]. Let Y ∈ G and
R0,Z = {α ∈ RZ | Y α = αY }, then R0,Z is commutative if and only if R0,C is
commutative.
Proof. This is clear from the previous lemma since it is only necessary for the sums∑
h∈Y -orbit
h to commute with each other, which is independent of the coefficients
in characteristic zero.
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This makes it possible to work over C and then deduce the results over Z
when necessary. This is useful since we already understand the representation
theory of G over C.
For a general group G it is possible for R0,F to be non-commutative as the
following shows:
Lemma 1.3.4. Let F be a finite field or an algebraically closed field and RF =
F [G] for a finite group G such that char(F ) - |G|. Let Y be an element of G. Let
ρ be an irreducible representation of G over F . If ρ(Y ) has a repeated eigenvalue
then R0,F = {α ∈ RF | Y α = αY } is not commutative.
Proof. Let ρ be an irreducible representation of G over F such that ρ(Y ) has a
repeated eigenvalue for some Y ∈ G. By Wedderburn’s theorem [13, p 142] we
know that F [G] '
⊕
Mni(Di) where Di is a division ring over F . But if F is
algebraically closed then Di = F , and if F is finite then Di is also a finite field by
another theorem of Wedderburn [13, p 143]. So F [G] is a direct sum of matrix
rings over fields. With out loss of generality let ρ be the projection of F [G] onto
Mn1 . Then ρ(Y ) can be put into rational canonical form. Now since ρ(Y ) is
diagonalizable there are no repeated factors in the minimal polynomial and since
ρ(Y ) has a repeated eigenvalue it has a repeated block. So ρ(Y ) has the following
form: 




... · · · . . . 0
0 · · · 0 Aβ

where the Aj’s come from the irreducible factors of the characteristic polynomial
of ρ(Y ). We may assume that A1 = A2 since ρ(Y ) has a repeated eigenvalue.
14








... · · · . . . 0








... · · · . . . 0
0 · · · 0 0





correspond to elements in
R0,F that do not commute with each other. So R0,F is non-commutative.
We can, however, determine when R0,C (and therefore R0,Z) is commutative.
Lemma 1.3.5. Let RC = C[G] where G is a finite non-commutative group and
let Y ∈ G. If σ(Y ) has distinct eigenvalues for all irreducible representations σ
of G over C then R0,C = {α ∈ RC | Y α = αY } is commutative.
Proof. If σ is an irreducible representation of G then, since Y has finite order,
there is a basis for which σ(Y ) is diagonal and σ(Y ) has distinct eigenvalues. This
implies that all matrices that commute with ρ(Y ) are also diagonal in the same
basis. So σ(R0,C) consists of diagonal matrices in this basis, and those commute
with each other. If this is true for all representations of G then it is true for the
regular representation, which is faithful. Therefore R0,C is commutative.
Lemma 1.3.6. Let H be a subgroup of G. Then each irreducible representation
W of H maps injectively into some irreducible representation V of G.
Proof. We know that the irreducible representations of H are contained in the
irreducible representations of G since irreducible representations are contained
in the complex group ring and C[H] ⊂ C[G]. This gives that each irreducible
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representation of H maps into each irreducible representation of G by either
the zero map or an injective map. Since not all of these maps can be zero
for a particular irreducible representation W of H, there exists an irreducible
representation V of G that W maps into injectively.
Theorem 1.3.7. Let G be a non-abelian group of order 2N where N is odd. Let
Y ∈ G have order 2 and suppose R0,Z = {α ∈ RZ | Y α = αY } is a commutative
subring of RZ = Z[G]. Then G = (Bo 〈Y 〉)⊕A, where A and B are abelian and
Y acts on A as the identity and on B by inversion.
Proof. Since Y is order two we know the only eigenvalues of σ(Y ) are 1 and
−1 for all representations σ of G over C. Therefore dim(σ(RC)) ≤ 2 for all
representations σ of G since R0,C is commutative which implies the irreducible
representations cannot have repeated eigenvalues (by Lemma 1.3.4). Since G
has order 2N where N is odd there exists H C G of index 2 with |H| = N
[2, p 124]. By Lemma 1.3.6 we know the irreducible representations of H are
contained in the irreducible representations of G and therefore H has only one
dimensional representations (the dimension of a representation must divide the
order of the group [15, p 52]) and therefore is abelian. Since H is abelian we get
that G = H o 〈Y 〉. Now Y splits H into H− ⊕ H+ where Y acts by inversion
on the elements of H− and trivially on the elements of H+. We can see this by




(2 is invertible since N is odd). So each element can




α and Y acts on 1−Y
2
α by inversion and trivially
on 1+Y
2
α. So G = H+ × (H− o 〈Y 〉) and both H− and H+ are abelian since H
is abelian.
Theorem 1.3.8. Consider the group H− o 〈Y 〉 where H− has odd order k and is
abelian, and where Y (order two) acts on the elements of H− by inversion. Then
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H− o 〈Y 〉 = Dk (the dihedral group of order 2k) if and only if H− o 〈Y 〉 can be
generated by two elements.
Proof. Clearly Dk can be generated by two elements, so we want to show if
H− o 〈Y 〉 can be generated by two elements that it is Dk. Since H− o 〈Y 〉 is
the union of elements of H− and elements of order two there are three cases to
consider. Note that elements of order two have the form Y A for A ∈ H−.
Case 1: Both generators are in H−. This causes a contradiction since they
never generate Y 6∈ H−.
Case 2: One generator A ∈ H− and the other generator B has order 2. Now
since B has order two then B = Y C for some C ∈ H−. So BAB−1 =
Y CAC−1Y = Y AY = A−1 since C and A are in H− and therefore commute
with each other and Y acts by inversion on all elements of H−. So this is
Dk for k equal to the order of A.
Case 3: Both generators have order 2. Then they have the form Y C and Y D
where C,D ∈ H−. So consider A = Y CY D = C−1D ∈ H− and B = Y C.
Clearly A,B still generate the same group and give us Case 2.
So in all cases we conclude that H− o 〈Y 〉 is Dk for some odd k (since H has odd
order).
Putting together Theorem 1.3.7 and Theorem 1.3.8 we get the following:
Corollary 1.3.9. Assume that G is a non-abelian group of order 2N where N
is odd. Also assume that there exists an element Y of order two in G such that
G = H+ × (H− o 〈Y 〉) where H = H− ⊕H+ has order N , both H− and H+ are
abelian, and Y acts by inversion on H−. Then H− o 〈Y 〉 = Dk (the dihedral
group of order 2k) if and only if H− o 〈Y 〉 can be generated by two elements.
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We have now described all situations in which the group is generated by X
and Y with Y order two so that R0 = {α ∈ R | Y α = αY } can be defined and
is a commutative subring. So now we can set up the cryptosystem identically
to the original system (except that we carry around A in the coefficients, which
does not affect the system’s implementation). We are also able to define R1 =
{α ∈ R | Y α = −αY } which allows us to use Coppersmith’s attack to break this
slight generalization of the original system. In the next chapter we will extend
the system and attack to a much larger set of group rings.
1.4 Commutative NTRU
The commutative system is also a public key cryptosystem and is based on a
polynomial ring, R = Z[x]/(xN − 1), where N is an odd prime and (N − 1)/2
also an odd prime. NTRU was first presented by J. Hoffstein, J. Piper and J. H.
Silverman in 1996 [8]. Since then there has been a variety of research published on
the system and two different signature schemes (the first of which, NSS [5, 9], is
insecure) have been developed. The second signature scheme (NTRUSign [7]) and
the cryptosystem itself were discovered to be based on a 2N×2N lattice that can
be used to obtain a submodule of R ⊕ R. NTRU is currently owned by NTRU
Cryptosystems, Inc. based in Burlington, MA. Their website, www.ntru.com,
includes many articles and notes on the system, as well as challenges to break
implementations of the system. They also describe their current beliefs on how
secure this system is and compare it to other cryptosystems, such as RSA. In
general all polynomials have coefficients of 1, 0,−1 (it is necessary for them to
be fairly small or the system won’t work) but with varying numbers of non-zero
coefficients. Example values of a current system are: N = 503, q = 256, p = 3.
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We again assume Alice wants to send a message to Bob. Bob chooses a
private key f ∈ R that is invertible modulo both p and q (which are relatively
prime positive integers) and another polynomial g ∈ R. Bob computes f−1q and
f−1p , the inverses of f modulo q and p respectively. Next he computes h ≡ f−1q g
(mod q). This h is Bob’s public key (so far everything but f and g are public).
Assume now that Alice wants to send a message, m ∈ R with coefficients small
modulo p, to Bob. Alice then chooses a random φ ∈ R and computes e ≡ pφ∗h+m
(mod q). She sends e, the encrypted message, to Bob. After Bob receives e he
computes
a ≡f ∗ e
≡f ∗ (pφ ∗ h+m)
≡f ∗ (pφ ∗ (f−1q g) +m
≡pφ ∗ g + f ∗m (mod q)
He next regards a as a polynomial with integer coefficients and reduces it modulo
p to get f ∗m. Then he computes
f−1p ∗ (a (mod p)) ≡ m (mod p)
to get m. This reduces to m since f and m have small coefficients.
So, as we can see, non-commutative NTRU is similar to commutative NTRU.
They both work with a group ring and work modulo q and p. They both rely
heavily on ‘smallness’ of the coefficients. But it is also clear that non-commutative
NTRU does not reduce to NTRU if we use the group ring of a commutative group.
In commutative NTRU all of the polynomials have small coefficients, but in non-
commutative NTRU f, F, ψ and m have ‘large’ coefficients. In particular it is
interesting that the message must be small in commutative NTRU, but not in
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non-commutative NTRU. It is also not necessary to have f−1p in non-commutative
NTRU. The public keys are slightly different - in commutative NTRU we only
have one multiplication, but in non-commutative NTRU there are two.
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Chapter 2
Extensions of Non-commutative NTRU
2.1 Introduction and Extension to Other Group
Rings
We now consider not only Z[DN ] but RZ = Z[G] where G is a finite group with
two generators, X and Y , that do not commute with each other. Let the order
of X be N and the order of Y be k, with N and k distinct primes, so that the
order of G is N · k. Unless it is otherwise stated we will assume that G is the
group defined by the presentation
G = 〈X, Y | Y XY −1 = Xu, XN = 1, Y k = 1〉
where u has order k modulo N . Note that 〈X〉 / G by definition and that N − 1
must be a multiple of k (since Y needs to act non-trivially on X). We also
need the assumption that q is prime (larger than Nk, since otherwise the system
will break down, as will the attack) and that p, r, s, and t are relatively prime
to Nk. We will denote RZ modulo q as Rq and R0,Z modulo q as R0,q. The
cryptosystem is set up in exactly the same way as in Section 1.2 and R0,Z is still
the commutative subring of RZ consisting of the elements that commute with Y .
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Bob chooses f ∈ Sf , ω ∈ Sω and computes F ∈ Sf such that f ∗F ≡ 1 (mod q).
Bob’s public key is then h = pF ∗ ω ∗ f (mod q) and the private keys are f and
F . Alice encrypts her message m ∈ Sm by randomly choosing φ, φ′ ∈ Sφ and
ψ ∈ Sψ. Then she computes Ψ ∈ R0,Z{p} such that Ψ ≡ ψ (mod p) and the pair
(e, E) with
e ≡ φ ∗ h ∗ φ′ + ψ (mod q)
E ≡ Ψ ∗ h+m (mod q).
She sends the pair (E, e) to Bob. To decrypt the message Bob computes
a ≡ f ∗ e ∗ F ≡ pφ ∗ ω ∗ φ′ + ψ (mod q)
and then reduces this modulo p to recover Ψ ≡ ψ (mod p). Now Bob can subtract
Ψ ∗ h (mod q) from E to obtain m.
We will give an example to help clarify the above description, but first it will
be helpful to have a better understanding of what R0,Z (or R0,q) looks like.
Let v be a multiplicative generator of (Z/NZ)∗ and m = N−1
k
−1. Recall that
u is an element of order k modulo N such that Y X = XuY ,
Definition 2.1.1. Define Wi = X
vi + Xv
iu + Xv
iu2 + · · · + Xviuk−1 ∈ F [G] for
0 ≤ i ≤ m, for any ring F .
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Note that each Wi is the sum of a “Y-orbit”. It is fixed under conjugation by
Y and therefore the Wi are elements of R0,F = {α ∈ RF | Y α = αY }.
Lemma 2.1.2. The elements of the subring R0,F = {α ∈ RF | Y α = αY } have
the following form:
α = P (Y ) +W0P0(Y ) +W1P1(Y ) + · · ·+WmPm(Y )
where P, P0, P1, . . . , Pm are polynomials in Y with coefficients in F .
Proof. This is simply a restatement of Lemma 1.3.2.
There is an example of this in Section 2.7.
2.2 Preliminary Representation Theory
In subsection 1.3.1 we stated that F [G], where F is a field with char(F ) - |G|, is
isomorphic to a direct sum of matrix rings over division rings [13, p 142]. We may
use representation theory to directly see what these rings are in the C[G] case.
Let ζ ∈ C be a primitive N th root of unity and zk ∈ C be a primitive kth root of
unity. Recall that m = N−1
k
− 1, v is a multiplicative generator of (Z/NZ)∗, and
that u is defined such that Y X = XuY . All representations in this section are
over C unless otherwise stated.
Lemma 2.2.1. Define the map τ : G → C∗ by τ(X) = 1, τ(Y ) = zk, and τ is
multiplicative. Then 1, τ, τ 2, τ 3, . . . , τ k−1 are one-dimensional irreducible repre-
sentations of G.
Proof. This is trivial since the powers of τ are lifts of the irreducible representa-
tions of G/〈X〉.
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0 1 0 0 · · · 0
0 0 1 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
0 0 · · · 0 1 0
0 0 · · · 0 0 1
1 0 · · · 0 0 0

.
are irreducible representations of G over C of dimension greater than one.
Proof. We need to show that each ρi preserves the group action. We know
ρi(Y X) = ρi(Y )ρi(X) =

0 ζv
iu 0 0 · · · 0
0 0 ζv
iu2 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
0 0 · · · 0 ζviuk−2 0
0 0 · · · 0 0 ζviuk−1
ζv
i
0 · · · 0 0 0

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So, now we need to show that this is equal to ρi(X














and multiplication by ρi(Y ) on the right clearly gives the previous matrix, since
uk = 1. Next we want to show that the only fixed subspaces of ρi are Ck and
{0}. First consider the fact that ρi(X) is diagonal with distinct entries, so only
diagonal matrices commute with it. Now, ρi(Y ) is an order k permutation, so
the only diagonal matrices that it commutes with are scalar. Therefore the only
matrices that commute with all ρ(g) are scalar. Suppose that W ⊂ Ck is fixed
by ρ and that W ′ is a G-stable complement of W . Let P be the projection map
from Ck = W ⊕ W ′ onto W . Then P commutes with ρ since for any g ∈ G,
w ∈ W and w′ ∈ W ′ we know
Pρ(g)(w + w′) = P (ρ(g)w + ρ(g)w′)
= P (ρ(g)w)
= ρ(g)w
= ρ(g)P (w + w′)
Therefore P is scalar, so W is either Ck or {0}.
Theorem 2.2.3. The following is a complete list of the irreducible representa-
tions of G: {1, τ, τ 2, τ 3, . . . , τ k−1, ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρm}
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Proof. All of the listed representations are distinct since ρi(X) and ρj(X) have
distinct eigenvalues for distinct i and j and τ i(Y ) and τ j(Y ) have distinct eigen-
values for distinct i and j. There are k one-dimensional representations and m+1
representations of dimension k, so the sum of the squares of the dimensions of
the representations is
k · 12 + (m+ 1) · k2 = k + (N − 1
k
)k2 = k +Nk − k = Nk
which is the order of G. Therefore there are no other irreducible representations.
So we have the representations of G and therefore we know that C[G] '
Ck ⊕Mk(C)(m+1). Now we can define the following representation of G over C.
















Next, we perform a change of basis on ρ̄ to get the following representation
ρ from G (over Zq) into the matrix ring M = M(m+1)k(Zq). Also, we give a
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conjecture of the form of ρ(Y ) that would give ρ as mapping into Z rather than
Zq.
Theorem 2.2.5. Consider the matrix
T =

1 1 . . . 1
1 + ζ−1 1 + ζ−u . . . 1 + ζ−v
muk−1






1 + · · ·+ ζ−(N−2) 1 + · · ·+ ζ−2·(N−2) . . . 1 + · · ·+ ζ−(N−2)·vmuk−1

∈ Mmk(C) (the order of the columns follows the order of ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρm). T is a
change of basis matrix that gives
T ρ̄(X)T−1 = ρ(X) =

0 0 0 · · · 0 −1
1 0 0 · · · 0 −1
0 1 0 · · · 0 −1







0 0 0 · · · 1 −1

.
Define ρ by ρ(α) = T ρ̄(α)T−1 for all α ∈ G. Then ρ : G → M(m+1)k(Q) is a
representation. Also the only denominators that appear in ρ(g) for any g ∈ G
are powers of N .
Proof. T ’s columns are the eigenvectors of X and therefore it is the change of
basis matrix that takes the diagonal form of X to its rational canonical form. T
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can be transformed by row operations into the following:
1 1 . . . 1
ζ−1 ζ−u . . . ζ−v
muk−1
ζ−2 ζ−2u . . . ζ−2·v
muk−1






ζ−(N−2) ζ−(N−2)·u . . . ζ−(N−2)·v
muk−1

which is a Vandermonde matrix and therefore its determinant is a product of (ζa−
ζb) for various a and b. Now each (ζa − ζb) divides N , so the only denominators
that can arise from the change of basis divide a power of N . Therefore the
entries of N `T−1 are algebraic integers for some `, so N `ρ(Y ) = T ρ̄(Y )N `T−1
also has entries that are algebraic integers. We need to show that the entries are
rational. To do this we show that ρ(Y ) is fixed by the Galois group of Q[ζ]. Let
σ ∈ Gal(Q[ζ]/Q). Then there exists Qσ ∈ M(m+1)k(C) such that σ(T ) = TQσ
and Qσ is a permutation matrix that permutes the columns of ρ̄. So
σ(ρ(Y )) = σ(T ρ̄(Y )T−1)





Now ρ̄(Y ) is rational and therefore is fixed by all elements of Gal(Q(ζ)/Q). Note





−1 = T ρ̄(Y )T−1 = ρ(Y ).
So we know that ρ(Y ) has rational entries, with the only possible denominators
integer powers of N .
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Corollary 2.2.6. The representation ρ given above can be reduced modulo q to
a representation from G to M(m+1)k(Zq)
Proof. We have shown that the only denominators that arise are primes lying over
N , therefore we can simply reduce each entry modulo q to get a representation
into M(m+1)k(Zq).
Through computing many examples we believe that ρ(Y ) actually lies in
M(m+1)k(Z). It seems to have a nice pattern of zeros, ones, and negative ones.
The following matrices are examples of ρ(Y ) that support the conjecture below:
This is for N = 19, k = 3, and u = 7:
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 −1 1 0 0 0
1 0 −1 1 0 −1 1 0 0 0 −1 1 0 −1 1 0 0 0
1 0 −1 1 0 −1 1 0 0 0 −1 1 0 −1 1 0 −1 1
1 0 −1 1 0 −1 1 0 −1 1 −1 1 0 −1 1 0 −1 1
0 1 −1 1 0 −1 1 0 −1 1 −1 1 0 −1 1 0 −1 1
0 1 −1 1 0 −1 1 0 −1 1 −1 0 1 −1 1 0 −1 1
0 1 −1 0 1 −1 1 0 −1 1 −1 0 1 −1 1 0 −1 1
0 1 −1 0 1 −1 1 0 −1 1 −1 0 1 −1 0 1 −1 1
0 1 −1 0 1 −1 0 1 −1 1 −1 0 1 −1 0 1 −1 1
0 1 −1 0 1 −1 0 1 −1 1 −1 0 1 −1 0 1 −1 0
0 1 −1 0 1 −1 0 1 −1 0 0 0 1 −1 0 1 −1 0
0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 1 −1 0 0 0 1 −1 0 1 −1 0
0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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This is for N = 19, k = 3, and u = 11:
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0
1 −1 1 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0
1 −1 1 0 0 0 −1 1 −1 1 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0
1 −1 1 0 0 0 −1 1 −1 1 0 0 0 −1 1 −1 1 0
1 −1 1 −1 1 0 −1 1 −1 1 0 0 0 −1 1 −1 1 0
1 −1 1 −1 1 0 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 0 −1 1 −1 1 0
1 −1 1 −1 1 0 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 0 −1 1 −1 1 −1
1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 0 1 −1 1 −1 1 0 −1 1 −1 1 −1
1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 0 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 0 1 −1 1 −1
0 0 1 −1 1 −1 0 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 0 1 −1 1 −1
0 0 1 −1 1 −1 0 0 0 1 −1 1 −1 0 1 −1 1 −1
0 0 1 −1 1 −1 0 0 0 1 −1 1 −1 0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 0 1 −1 1 −1 0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 0 0 0

This is for N = 11, k = 5, and u = 4:
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 −1 1 0 −1 1 0 0 0
1 0 −1 1 0 −1 1 0 −1 1
0 1 −1 1 0 −1 1 0 −1 1
0 1 −1 0 1 −1 1 0 −1 1
0 1 −1 0 1 −1 0 1 −1 1
0 1 −1 0 1 −1 0 1 −1 0
0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 1 −1 0




This is for N = 11, k = 5, and u = 5:
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 −1 1
1 0 0 0 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1
1 0 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1
0 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1
0 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 0
0 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 0 0 0
0 1 −1 1 −1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Conjecture 2.2.7. Let N − 1 = u · a+ b and define eA..B to be the column with
ones in positions A through B and zeros elsewhere, and −eA..B to be the column




e1..u eu+1..2u · · · e(a−1)·u+1..a·u −e2..a·u
)
and let B2 be B1 shifted down by one with the new top row all zeros, B3 be B2
shifted down by one with the new top row all zeros, etc. So each B` has a + 1
columns. Let N − 1 = (a+ 1) · c+ d, then ρ(Y ) has the following form:
(
B1 B2 · · · Bc Bc+1
)
with Bc+1 truncated at the dth column.
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2.3 Extension of Coppersmith’s Attack
For the attack we need to do more work than in the DN case, but just like in the
DN case we only need knowledge of the system setup (i.e. N,R,R0, q, p, r, s, t)
and the public information (i.e. h) to break the system. Let S be the ring of
integers for a number field such that S contains ζ (a primitive N th root of unity)
and zk, a primitive k
th root of unity. Let Q be a prime ideal in S such that
Q∩Z = qZ. We need to move to an extension of Z since we do not always know
that a primitive kth root of unity modulo q exists. Let RS = S[G]. Let R0,S
be the elements that commute with Y , RQ = RS (mod Q), and R0,Q = R0,S
(mod Q) .
To start we consider the following subsets of RQ:
R1 = {α ∈ RQ | Y α = zkαY }
R2 = {α ∈ RQ | Y α = z2kαY }
... =
...
Rk−1 = {α ∈ RQ | Y α = zk−1k αY }.
Note that since we only define these Rj’s modulo Q we won’t worry about adding
the subscriptQ. One of the key results of this section is Theorem 2.3.10. It proves
that each of these Ri are principal R0,Q modules. The following lemma shows
that each Rj has a structure similar to R0,Q.
Definition 2.3.1. Define Wi,j = X
vi +z−jk X
viu+z−2jk X
viu2 +· · ·+z−(k−1)jk Xv
iuk−1
for 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 and for 0 ≤ i ≤ m. (For j = 0 we get the Wi as defined for
R0,Q.)
Lemma 2.3.2. The elements of the subset Rj as defined above have the following
form for 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1:
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P (Y ) +W0,jP0(Y ) +W1,jP1(Y ) + · · ·+Wm,jPm(Y )
Proof. Follows just as in the proof of Lemma 1.3.2.
Note that only R0,Q is actually a subring. The other Rj are closed under
addition but not multiplication and in fact are R0,Q modules.
Lemma 2.3.3. Let α ∈ Ri and β ∈ Rj for some i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1}. Then
αβ ∈ Ri+j.
Proof. Conjugation of αβ by Y gives the following:





Therefore αβ ∈ Ri+j.
Definition 2.3.4. Define σ as the action of conjugation by Y on RQ. Define
πj ∈ End(RQ) by πj = (I + z−jk σ+ z
−2j
k σ
2 + · · ·+ z−(k−1)jk σk−1) for 0 ≤ j ≤ k− 1,
where I represents the identity action on RQ.
Lemma 2.3.5. We have the following:
Rj = {α ∈ RQ | σ(α) = zjkα}










for 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 (where R0 = R0,Q).
Proof. Given the definition of the πj, Lemma 2.1.2, and Lemma 2.3.2, the result
is clear.
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Theorem 2.3.6. The group ring RQ breaks into the sum R0,Q + R1 + · · ·Rk−1
and each element of R can be written uniquely as a sum of this form.
Proof. Let π = π0 + π1 + · · ·+ πk−1. Then π ≡ k · I (mod Q) since 1 + zk + z2k +
· · · + zk−1k ≡ 0 (mod Q). Now by Lemma 1.3.2 we know that π0(α) ∈ R0,Q and
similarly for any α ∈ RQ, πj(α) ∈ Rj for all j. Then kα ≡ π(α) ≡ π0(α)+π1(α)+
· · ·+πk−1(α) (mod Q), which gives us kα as an element of the sum. Then dividing
by k modulo Q gives the desired result. Suppose that r ∈ R can be written as
r0 + r1 + · · ·+ rk−1 and as r′0 + r′1 + · · ·+ r′k−1. Then the difference of these two




j(r0 + r1 + · · ·+ rk−1− r′0− r′1−· · ·− r′k−1)Y −j =
0. But this sum is equal to k(ra − r′a), so ra − r′a = 0. This is true for any
choice of a and therefore each element of R can uniquely be written as a sum in
R0,Q +R1 + · · ·Rk−1.
Lemma 2.3.7. Let F be a field. Let M ∈ M`(F) be a matrix, let f(t) ∈ F(t),
and suppose the number of elements of F is greater than `. If every F-linear
combination of f(M), f(M2), . . . , f(Mk−1) is not invertible in F, then they have
a common non-zero null space element of Fk−1.




2) + · · ·+ ak−1f(Mk−1)
)
= g(a1, a2, . . . , ak−1) = 0.
Note g is a polynomial of degree less than or equal to ` in every variable and it
is the zero function on Fk−1. We want to show that g is the zero polynomial.
Suppose that a1 through ak−2 are chosen, then g reduces to a polynomial in
ak−1 that is the zero function on F with degree less than `. Therefore it is the
zero polynomial on F. This implies that the coefficients are zero polynomials in
a1, a2, . . . , ak−2. Now by induction on k we get that g(t1, t2, . . . , tk−1) is the zero
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λ1 ∗ ∗ · · · ∗
0 λ2 ∗ · · · ∗
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 λ`−1 ∗
0 0 · · · 0 λ`

.















tif(λi2) ∗ · · · ∗
...
. . . . . .
...






























for all i. Let ej0 be the j
th
0 basis vector in F̄`, then Af(M i)A−1ej0 = 0 for all
i and so f(M i)A−1ej0 = 0 for all i since A is invertible. Hence A
−1ej0 ∈ F̃k−1
is a common null space vector for {f(M), f(M2), . . . f(Mk−1)}, where F̃ is an
extension of F of dimension r for some r ∈ Z. Let F̃ = Fβ1 + Fβ2 + · · · + Fβr,
then A−1ej0 = v1β1 + v2β2 + · · · + vrβr for some vi ∈ Fm. This gives us that
f(M i)v1β1 + f(M
i)v2β2 + · · · + f(M i)vrβr = 0 for all i, which implies that
f(M i)v1 = 0 for all i since the βi are linearly independent. Therefore v1 is a
common null space element in F`.
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Lemma 2.3.8. For any invertible matrix M , the inverse of M is a polynomial
in M .
Proof. Let P (t) = ant
n + an−1t
n−1 + · · ·+ a1t+ a0 be the minimal polynomial of




Mn−2 + · · ·+ −a1
a0




Mn−2 + · · ·+ −a1
a0
is
the inverse of M .
Definition 2.3.9. Define the polynomial
fj(t) = t+ z
−j
k t
u + z−2jk t
u2 + · · ·+ z−(k−1)jk t
uk−1
for 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1.
Note that fj(X
`) ∈ Rj for all ` ≥ 0 and for 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1.
The following is the key result that allows us to extend Coppersmith’s attack
to these group rings.
Theorem 2.3.10. For 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, the subset Rj of RQ is equal to ΓjR0,Q
and R0,QΓj for some Γj ∈ Rj.




i) is not invertible
modulo Q. Then we know fj(ρ(X)), fj(ρ(X2)), . . . , fj(ρ(Xk−1)) have a common
null space element moduloQ and the proof of Lemma 2.3.7 gives us that fj(ζai) ≡
0 in S/Q for some a and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. We also know that fj(1) is zero
in S/Q since its coefficients sum to zero modulo Q. Therefore
1 1 1 . . . 1
ζ ζu ζu
2



























in S/Q. But it is a Vandermonde matrix, so its determinant is a product of
(ζa−ζb) for various a and b and these divide N . Therefore the matrix is invertible
modulo Q. This is a contradiction since it has a non-empty null space. Therefore




i)) that is invertible modulo Q. We can then




i) and since fj(X
i) ∈ Rj for all i,
Γj ∈ Rj. Since Γ′j is an invertible matrix its inverse, r′, is a polynomial in Γ′j
(by Lemma 2.3.8). Hence r′ is in the image of ρ. So there exists an r ∈ R with
ρ(r) = r′. Now since I = Γ′jr
′ = ρ(Γjr) (where I is the identity matrix) we
get that Γjr − 1 is in the kernel of ρ. The kernel of ρ is contained in R0,Q, so
Γjr−1 ∈ R0,Q. But 1 ∈ R0,Q, so Γjr ∈ R0,Q. Now we need to show that r can be
chosen to be in R−j, so that rβ ∈ R0,Q for all β ∈ Rj. Let r = r0 + r1 + · · ·+ rk−1
where ri ∈ Ri. Then
Γjr = Y ΓjrY
−1
= z−jk ΓjY (r0 + r1 + · · ·+ rk−1)Y
−1
= z−jk Γj(r0 + z
−1
k r1 + · · ·+ z
−(k−1)
k rk−1).
Now Γjri ∈ Rj+i for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, so from the expansion of the left hand side
we get Γjri = z
−j−i
k Γjri for all i. Therefore Γjri = 0 for i 6= −j. So Γjr = Γjr−j
and ρ(Γj)ρ(r) = ρ(Γj)ρ(r−j). Now since ρ(Γj) = Γ
′
j is invertible, ρ(r) = ρ(r−j).
Therefore without loss of generality we may assume that r ∈ R−j. Let β ∈ Rj
then rβ ∈ R0,Q and Γjrβ ∈ Rj. Now ρ(β − Γjrβ) = 0 so β − Γjrβ ∈ R0,Q.
But both summands are elements of Rj and therefore they must be equal. Since
β ∈ Rj we get β = Γjα where α = rβ ∈ R0,Q which gives Rj = ΓjR0,Q. Now it is




′ commute with each other (see proof of Lemma 2.3.8).
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Next we want to show that it is not necessary to use this technique to find
all of the Γj (unless zk exists modulo q). Let F = S/Q. Then F is a finite
extension of Fq. Let the number of Gal(F/Fq) orbits of zk be δ. Let zj1k , z
j2
k , . . . z
jδ
k
be representatives of these orbits. Then we need to find Γj1 ,Γj2 , . . . ,Γjδ using
Theorem 2.3.10, but we can obtain the rest of the Γj by applying elements of
Gal(F/Fq) to these Γj. This allows us to write each element α of R in the
following way:






2.4 Breaking the System when zk exists
Now we would like to break the system. This requires the creation of θ. Recall
that θ needs the following properties:
• θ is the identity on R0 (mod q)
• θ maps Rj (mod q) to itself for all j
• θ is left and right R0 linear
• θ(h) is a multiple of p and ω′ = θ(h)/p has small coefficients modulo q.
If we can define such a θ then θ(e) (mod q) modulo p will allow us to find the
message m that was sent. All that is left to be able to create θ is to define ω′.
We do this by noting that
h+Y hY −1+Y 2hY −2+· · ·Y −1hY = p(ω+Y ωY −1+Y 2ωY −2+· · ·Y −1ωY ) ∈ R0,q
just as before. So we create our ω′ by dividing the coefficients of this sum into k
equal (or as close to equal as possible) parts to define ω′ modulo q. This ω′ will
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have coefficients of the same size as ω, so that the coefficients are ‘small enough’
to break the system.
We solve θ(h) = pω′ by using Theorem 2.3.6 and Theorem 2.3.10 to reduce it
to solving equations in R0,q. Let
h = h0 + h1 + h2 + · · ·+ hk−1
= h0 + Γ1h0,1 + Γ2h0,2 + . . .Γk−1h0,k−1
and




2 + · · ·+ ω′k−1




0,2 + . . .Γk−1ω
′
0,k−1
(incorporating the p into the notation) where hj, ω
′
j ∈ Rj and h0,j, ω′0,j ∈ R0,q
for all j. Now since θ takes Rj into itself for 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, we must have
θ(Γj) = Γjr0,j for some r0,j ∈ R0,q. Therefore
θ(h) = θ(h0 + Γ1h0,1 + Γ2h0,2 + . . .Γk−1h0,k−1)
= h0 + θ(Γ1h0,1) + θ(Γ2h0,2) + · · ·+ θ(Γk−1h0,k−1)
= h0 + θ(Γ1)h0,1 + θ(Γ2)h0,2 + . . . θ(Γk−1)h0,k−1
= h0 + Γ1r0,1h0,1 + Γ2r0,2h0,2 + . . .Γk−1r0,k−1h0,k−1
This must equal




0,2 + . . .Γk−1ω
′
0,k−1
Since R = ⊕Rj we now need only solve r0,jh0,j = ω′0,j for r0,j for all j such that
1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1. To do this we can write down the system of equations or the
matrix that represents this system for the coefficients of r0,j and solve using linear
algebra techniques. Again we need to worry about when a solution exists. This
is discussed in Section 2.6. There is an example in Section 2.7.
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Theorem 2.4.1. Define θ(α) = r̄0,jα for α ∈ Rj where r̄0,j is such that r̄0,jΓj =
Γjr0,j with r0,j defined above. Then θ is a ring homomorphism from R to R that
is left and right R0 linear.
Proof. We know that each Rj is a principal left and right R0 module, so there
exists such an r̄0,j ∈ R0. Let α ∈ Rj and x, y ∈ R0 then
θ(xαy) = r̄0,jxαy
= xr̄0,jαy since R0 is commutative
= xθ(α)y
Therefore θ is left and right R0 linear.
2.5 When zk does not exist modulo q
Creating the system is exactly the same as when zk does exist modulo q. The
difference arrives when we try to break the system. If zk does not exist then we
need S and Q to be as described in Section 2.3 and then everything works as in
the last section except that we must show that θ(e) is rational.
Theorem 2.5.1. Let τ ∈ Gal(Q[zk]/Q), then τ(θ(e)) = θ(e).
Proof. We know that
θ(e) = θ(e0 + Γ1e0,1 + Γ2e0,2 + · · ·+ Γk−1e0,k−1)
= e0 + θ(Γ1)e0,1 + θ(Γ2)e0,2 + · · ·+ θ(Γk−1)e0,k−1
= e0 + Γ1r0,1e0,1 + Γ2r0,2e0,2 + · · ·+ Γk−1r0,k−1e0,k−1.
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Now by the discussion at the end of the previous section we also know that






This sum is clearly invariant under the Galois group, so θ(e) is rational.
So to solve in this situation it is necessary to work in an extension field, but
the results will lie in the base field. Note that Theorem 2.4.1 still applies here,
so that θ is both left and right R0 linear.
There is an example in Section 2.7.
2.6 Invertibility of h
We know that finding θ reduces to solving r0,jih0,ji = ω0,ji for r0,ji for 1 ≤ i ≤ δ. It
suffices to invert h0,ji . Now h0,ji ∈ R0,S and if we assume it is a random element,
then we can use the following argument to determine the probability that it is
invertible.
We know that R = ⊕Mni(Fqmi ) by [13, p 142]. Now Y maps to a permutation
matrix of order k in each of the matrix rings where ni 6= 1 under the maps ρi.
We know that Y is diagonalizable and has distinct eigenvalues. Suppose that
Bρi(Y )B
−1 is diagonal. Then the only matrices that commute with Bρi(Y )B
−1
are also diagonal. Let D be such a matrix. Then B−1DB commutes with ρi(Y ),
so R0 maps into this set of matrices contained in ⊕Mni(Fqmi ). We know that














We know that there are k one-dimensional representations and N−1
k
representa-
tions of dimension k. Also, 1 will be a lower bound on the mi’s so we get the












1− k +N − 1
q
which is close to 1 as long as q is large enough compared to N and k, and this
is a required for the system to work. If we recall the numbers that Coppersmith
gave as an example, N = 263, k = 2, q = 125003 we get the probability that h0,1
is invertible is at least 97.88%.
2.7 Examples
Example 2.7.1. Let N = 7, k = 3, q = 199, p = r = t = 3, and s = 50.
So our group G = 〈X, Y | X7 = 1, Y 3 = 1, Y X = X2Y 〉. In this situation a
primitive third root of unity does exist modulo 199 and is equal to 92 modulo 199.
To simplify notation let:





The following is the system set-up, the encryption, and decryption.
Bob makes the following choices:
f = 66 + 91W0 − 26Y + 64W0Y − 2W1Y + 37Y 2 + 18W0Y 2 + 35W1Y 2
ω = 1 +X −X2 +X3 −X4 +X5 −X6
+ Y −XY +X2Y +X4Y −X5Y
− Y 2 +XY 2 +X2Y 2 +X3Y 2 +X4Y 2 −X5Y 2
and computes the following:
F = f−1
= −98− 78W0 + 5W1 − 74Y − 70W0Y + 56W1Y
− 29Y 2 + 64W0Y 2 − 65W1Y 2
h = Fωf
= 3− 96X − 65X2 + 83X3 − 41X4 −X5 − 79X6
+ 3Y + 6XY − 16X2Y − 80X3Y + 13X4Y + 12X5Y + 65X6Y
− 3Y 2 + 81XY 2 + 56X2Y 2 + 71X4Y 2 + 40X5Y 2 − 40X6Y 2
Bob now makes h public and keeps f, F, and ω private.
To send Bob a message Alice makes the following choices:
φ = −W0 + Y +W0Y +W1Y − Y 2 −W1Y 2
φ′ = 1 +W0 +W1 +W0Y + Y
2 +W1Y
2
ψ = −23− 6W0 − 7W1 + 7Y − 3W0Y − 17W1Y − 3Y 2 + 13W0Y 2 − 17W1Y 2
She reduces ψ modulo p to get Ψ = 1−W1 +Y +W1Y +W0Y 2 +W1Y 2 and then
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computes the following:
e = φhφ′ + ψ
= −41− 46X + 99X2 − 44X3 − 35X4 + 41X5 + 36X6
+ 22Y + 75XY − 59X2Y −X3Y − 70X4Y − 81X5Y + 4X6Y
− 25XY 2 − 36X2Y 2 + 4X3Y 2 − 90X4Y 2 −X5Y 2 − 81X6Y 2
E = Ψh+m
= −36 + 58X − 38X2 − 89X3 + 26X4 + 39X5 −X6
− 10Y + 70XY + 5X2Y + 22X3Y − 48X4Y − 13X5Y + 39X6Y
+ 48Y 2 − 78XY 2 + 72X2Y 2 − 43X3Y 2 − 79X4Y 2 +X5Y 2 + 30X6Y 2
using her message
m = −48 + 22X2 − 3X3 + 6X4 − 23X5 − 31X6
− 19Y + 48XY − 36X2Y + 27X3Y − 89X5Y + 92X6Y
+ 54Y 2 − 28XY 2 + 81X2Y 2 − 81X3Y 2 + 49X4Y 2 + 60X5Y 2 − 3X6Y 2
She now sends the pair (e, E) to Bob.
Bob uses his private keys to compute:
a = feF
= −41 + 6X + 12X2 + 23X3 + 17X5 − 7X6
+ 22Y − 12XY − 24X2Y − 44X3Y − 18X4Y − 14X5Y − 20X6Y
+ 10XY 2 + 16X2Y 2 − 20X3Y 2 + 22X4Y 2 − 44X5Y 2 − 14X6Y 2
which he then reduces modulo p to get
ap = 1−X3 −X5 −X6 + Y +X3Y +X5Y +X6Y
+XY 2 +X2Y 2 +X3Y 2 +X4Y 2 +X5Y 2 +X6Y 2.
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Next Bob computes:
E − hap = −48 + 22X2 − 3X3 + 6X4 − 23X5 − 31X6
− 19Y + 48XY − 36X2Y + 27X3Y − 89X5Y + 92X6Y
+ 54Y 2 − 28XY 2 + 81X2Y 2 − 81X3Y 2 + 49X4Y 2 + 60X5Y 2 − 3X6Y 2
which is the message that Alice sent.
To break the system we only know:
h = 3− 96X − 65X2 + 83X3 − 41X4 −X5 − 79X6
+ 3Y + 6XY − 16X2Y − 80X3Y + 13X4Y + 12X5Y + 65X6Y
− 3Y 2 + 81XY 2 + 56X2Y 2 + 71X4Y 2 + 40X5Y 2 − 40X6Y 2
e = −41− 46X + 99X2 − 44X3 − 35X4 + 41X5 + 36X6
+ 22Y + 75XY − 59X2Y −X3Y − 70X4Y − 81X5Y + 4X6Y
− 25XY 2 − 36X2Y 2 + 4X3Y 2 − 90X4Y 2 −X5Y 2 − 81X6Y 2
E = −36 + 58X − 38X2 − 89X3 + 26X4 + 39X5 −X6
− 10Y + 70XY + 5X2Y + 22X3Y − 48X4Y − 13X5Y + 39X6Y
+ 48Y 2 − 78XY 2 + 72X2Y 2 − 43X3Y 2 − 79X4Y 2 +X5Y 2 + 30X6Y 2
We compute
h+ Y hY 2 + Y 2hY = p(ω + Y ωY 2 + Y 2ωY )
= 3(3 +W0 −W1 + 3Y +W0Y −W1Y − 3Y 2 + 3W0Y 2)
So ω′ = 1 +X −X3 + Y +XY −X3Y − Y 2 +XY 2 +X2Y 2 +X4Y 2.
Now it is necessary to break both h and pω′ into their R0, R1, and R2 parts. We
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define the following to simplify notation:
W10 = X − 93X2 + 92X4
W11 = X
3 − 93X6 + 92X5
W20 = X + 92X
2 − 93X4
W21 = X
3 + 92X6 − 93X5
So we get the following:
h0 = 3−W0 +W1 + 3Y +W0Y −W1Y − 3Y 2 + 3W0Y 2
h1 = −91W10 + 24W11 + 37W10Y + 69W11Y + 74W10Y 2 + 54W11Y 2
h2 = −4W20 + 58W21 − 32W20Y + 51W21Y + 4W20Y 2 − 54W21Y 2
ω′0 = h0
ω′1 = −W10 +W11 +W10Y −W11Y
ω′2 = −W20 +W21 +W20Y −W21Y





′. Next we note that W10 generates R1 as an R0 module
and W20 generates R2 as an R0 module, since
W10 = W10 ∗ 1
W11 = W10 ∗ (92W0 −W1)
W20 = W20 ∗ 1
W21 = W20 ∗ (−93W0 −W1).
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Now we can rewrite h1, h2, w1, and w2 as the following:
h1 = W10(−91 + 24(92W0 −W1) + (37 + 69(92W0 −W1))Y
+ (74 + 54(92W0 −W1))Y 2)
h2 = W20(−4 + 58(−93W0 −W1) + (−32 + 51(−93W0 −W1))Y
+ (4− 54(−93W0 −W1))Y 2)
w1 = W10(−1 + (92W0 −W1) + (1− (92W0 −W1))Y )
w2 = W20(−1 + (−93W0 −W1) + (1− (−93W0 −W1))Y )
This reduces our work to solving
θ(W10)
(
(−91 + 24(92W0 −W1) + (37 + 69(92W0 −W1))Y
+ (74 + 54(92W0 −W1))Y 2)
)




(−4 + 58(−93W0 −W1) + (−32 + 51(−93W0 −W1))Y
+ (4− 54(−93W0 −W1))Y 2)
)
= W20(−1 + (−93W0 −W1) + (1− (−93W0 −W1))Y ).
But θ(W10) is an element of R1 and θ(W20) is an element of R2 so they must




where r0,1, r0,2 ∈ R0. Let








then we need only solve
W10r0,1
(
(−91 + 24(92W0 −W1) + (37 + 69(92W0 −W1))Y
+ (74 + 54(92W0 −W1))Y 2)
)




(−4 + 58(−93W0 −W1) + (−32 + 51(−93W0 −W1))Y
+ (4− 54(−93W0 −W1))Y 2)
)
= W20(−1 + (−93W0 −W1) + (1− (−93W0 −W1))Y )
for r0,1 and r0,2. Using Maple and Magma we find that
r0,1 = 8− 30X − 30X2 − 62X3 − 30X4 − 62X5 − 62X6
+ (−68 + 40X + 40X2 + 64X3 + 40X4 + 64X5 + 64X6)Y
+ (60− 10X − 10X2 − 2X3 − 10X4 − 2X5 − 2X6)Y 2
r0,2 = 2 + 56X + 56X
2 + 31X3 + 56X4 + 31X5 + 31X6
+ (7− 10X − 10X2 + 2X3 − 10X4 + 2X5 + 2X6)Y
+ (−9− 46X − 46X2 − 33X3 − 46X4 − 33X5 − 33X6)Y 2




To break the system we need to find θ(e). To do this we break e into its R0, R1,
and R2 parts and we get the following:
e0 = −41 + 6W0 + 11W1 + (22− 18W0 − 26W1)Y
+ (0 + 16W0 − 26W1)Y 2
e1 = W10(−7− 49(92W0 −W1) + (54− 20(92W0 −W1))Y
+ (−47 + 69(92W0 −W1))Y 2)
e2 = W20(−45− 6(−93W0 −W1) + (39 + 45(−93W0 −W1))Y
+ (6− 39(−93W0 −W1))Y 2).
So θ(e) reduces to
θ(e) = −41 + 3X + 14X3 + 15X4 + 8X5 + 11X6
+ (22− 24X − 9X2 − 26X3 − 21X4 − 23X5 − 29X6)Y
+ (25X + 13X2 − 29X3 + 10X4 − 26X5 − 23X6)Y 2
Reducing this modulo p = 3 we get 1−X3 −X5 −X6 + (1 +X3 +X5 +X6)Y +
(X +X2 +X3 +X4 +X5 +X6)Y 2 which should be ψ modulo p. Using this and
h we compute
E − h(1−X3 −X5 −X6 + (1 +X3 +X5 +X6)Y
+ (X +X2 +X3 +X4 +X5 +X6)Y 2)
≡ −48 + 22X2 − 3X3 + 6X4 − 23X5 − 31X6
− 19Y + 48XY − 36X2Y + 27X3Y − 89X5Y + 92X6Y
+ 54Y 2 − 28XY 2 + 81X2Y 2 − 81X3Y 2 + 49X4Y 2 + 60X5Y 2 − 3X6Y 2
which is the message m.
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Example 2.7.2. Let N = 7, k = 3, q = 197, p = r = t = 3, and s = 50.
So our group G = 〈X, Y | X7 = 1, Y 3 = 1, Y X = X2Y 〉. In this situation
a primitive third root of unity does not exist (modulo 197) so we must formally
adjoin one to our coefficient ring. It will be denoted by z. To simplify notation let:




The following is the system set-up, the encryption, and decryption.
Bob makes the following choices:
f = 37− 42W0 − 79W1 − 19Y + 35W0Y + 40W1Y + 26Y 2 + 74W0Y 2 + 37W1Y 2
ω = 1 +X +X3 − Y +XY +X2Y +X3Y −X4Y +X5Y +X6Y
+X2Y 2 −X3Y 2 −X4Y 2 +X5Y 2 −X6Y 2
and computes the following:
F = f−1
= 75− 81X − 81X2 − 49X3 − 81X4 − 49X5 − 49X6
− 8Y − 46XY − 46X2Y + 15X3Y − 46X4Y + 15X5Y + 15X6Y
+ 77Y 2 − 32XY 2 − 32X2Y 2 + 34X3Y 2 − 32X4Y 2 + 34X5Y 2 + 34X6Y 2
h = Fωf
= 3 + 50X − 84X2 − 71X3 + 37X4 + 10X5 + 64X6
+−3Y + 39XY − 6X2Y + 80X3Y − 30X4Y + 75X5Y + 51X6Y
+ 8XY 2 − 57X2Y 2 + 7X3Y 2 + 49X4Y 2 − 57X5Y 2 + 47X6Y 2
Bob now makes h public and keeps f, F, and ω private.
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To send Bob a message Alice makes the following choices:
φ = W1 + Y −W0Y +W1Y +W1Y 2
φ′ = −1−W0 −W1 + Y +W0Y +W1Y − Y 2 +W0Y 2 +W1Y 2
ψ = 12 + 8W0 + 2W1 − 6Y − 22W0Y − 2W1Y − 24Y 2 + 22W0Y 2 + 13W1Y 2
She reduces ψ modulo p to get Ψ = −W0 −W1 −W0Y +W1Y +W0Y 2 +W1Y 2
and then computes the following:
e = φhφ′ + ψ
= 21 + 63X − 92X2 − 33X3 + 2X4 − 54X5 + 75X6
− 15Y − 64XY + 26X2Y − 23X3Y + 47X4Y − 29X5Y − 37X6Y
+ 30Y 2 + 72XY 2 + 76X2Y 2 − 39X3Y 2 + 20X4Y 2 + 72X5Y 2 − 71X6Y 2
E = Ψh+m
= 4 + 54X + 90X2 − 53X3 − 80X4 − 18X5 + 35X6
− 62Y + 43XY − 22X2Y − 24X3Y − 15X4Y + 46X5Y + 84X6Y
− 68Y 2 + 57XY 2 − 9X2Y 2 + 55X3Y 2 − 43X4Y 2 + 2X5Y 2 − 38X6Y 2
using her message
m = −5− 50X − 47X2 − 54X3 − 33X4 − 28X5 + 52X6
− 47Y + 77XY + 97X2Y − 12X3Y + 68X4Y − 29X5Y − 32X6Y
− 71Y 2 + 56XY 2 − 58X2Y 2 − 50X3Y 2 − 44X4Y 2 + 96X5Y 2 − 45X6Y 2
She now sends the pair (e, E) to Bob.
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Bob uses his private keys to compute:
a = feF
= 21− 4X − 13X2 − 10X3 − 10X4 − 19X5 + 17X6
− 15Y + 14XY − 22X2Y + 7X3Y + 17X4Y + 61X5Y + 40X6Y
+ 30Y 2 + 76XY 2 + 40X2Y 2 + 67X3Y 2 + 52X4Y 2 + 49X5Y 2 + 43X6Y 2
which he then reduces modulo p to get ap = −X−X2−X3−X4−X5−X6−XY −
X2Y +X3Y −X4Y +X5Y +X6Y +XY 2+X2Y 2+X3Y 2+X4Y 2+X5Y 2+X6Y 2.
Next Bob computes:
E−hap = −5− 50X − 47X2 − 54X3 − 33X4 − 28X5 + 52X6
− 47Y + 77XY + 97X2Y − 12X3Y + 68X4Y − 29X5Y − 32X6Y
− 71Y 2 + 56XY 2 − 58X2Y 2 − 50X3Y 2 − 44X4Y 2 + 96X5Y 2 − 45X6Y 2
which is the message that Alice sent.
To break the system we only know:
h = 3 + 50X − 84X2 − 71X3 + 37X4 + 10X5 + 64X6
+−3Y + 39XY − 6X2Y + 80X3Y − 30X4Y + 75X5Y + 51X6Y
+ 8XY 2 − 57X2Y 2 + 7X3Y 2 + 49X4Y 2 − 57X5Y 2 + 47X6Y 2
e = 21 + 63X − 92X2 − 33X3 + 2X4 − 54X5 + 75X6
− 15Y − 64XY + 26X2Y − 23X3Y + 47X4Y − 29X5Y − 37X6Y
+ 30Y 2 + 72XY 2 + 76X2Y 2 − 39X3Y 2 + 20X4Y 2 + 72X5Y 2 − 71X6Y 2
E = 4 + 54X + 90X2 − 53X3 − 80X4 − 18X5 + 35X6
− 62Y + 43XY − 22X2Y − 24X3Y − 15X4Y + 46X5Y + 84X6Y
− 68Y 2 + 57XY 2 − 9X2Y 2 + 55X3Y 2 − 43X4Y 2 + 2X5Y 2 − 38X6Y 2
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We compute
h+ Y hY 2 + Y 2hY = p(ω + Y ωY 2 + Y 2ωY )
= 9 + 3X + 3X2 + 3X4 + 3X3 + 3X5 + 3X6
− 9Y + 3XY + 3X2Y + 3X4Y + 9X3Y + 9X5Y + 9X6Y
− 3X3Y 2 − 3X5Y 2 − 3X6Y 2
So ω′ = 1+X+X3−Y +XY +X3Y +X5Y +X6Y −X3Y 2 Now it is necessary
to break both h and pω′ into their R0, R1, and R2 parts. We define the following
to simplify notation:
W10 = X + z
2X2 + zX4
W11 = X
3 + z2X6 + zX5
W20 = X + zX
2 + z2X4
W21 = X
3 + zX6 + z2X5
So we get the following:
h0 = 3 +W0 +W1 − 3Y +W0Y + 3W1Y −W1Y 2
h1 = (91z + 70)W10 + (18z − 27)W11 + (8z + 23)W10Y + (−8z − 64)W11Y
+ (96z + 52)W10Y
2 + (−31z + 87)W11Y 2
h2 = (−91z − 21)W20 + (−18z − 45)W21 + (−8z + 15)W20Y + (8z − 56)W21Y
+ (−96z − 44)W20Y 2 + (31z − 79)W21Y 2
ω′0 = h0
ω′1 = W10 +W11 +W10Y −W11Y 2
ω′2 = W20 +W21 +W20Y −W21Y 2
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′ Next we note that W10 generates R1 as an R0 module
and W20 generates R2 as an R0 module, since
W10 = W10 ∗ 1
W11 = W10 ∗ (zW0 −W1)
W20 = W20 ∗ 1
W21 = W20 ∗ (z2W0 −W1).
Now we can rewrite h1, h2, w1, and w2 as the following:
h1 = W10(91z + 70 + (18z − 27)(zW0 −W1)
+ (8z + 23 + (−8z − 64)(zW0 −W1))Y
+ (96z + 52 + (−31z + 87)(zW0 −W1))Y 2)
h2 = W20(−91z − 21 + (−18z − 45)(z2W0 −W1)
+ (−8z + 15 + (8z − 56)(z2W0 −W1))Y
+ (−96z − 44 + (31z − 79)(z2W0 −W1))Y 2)
w1 = W10(1 + zW0 −W1 + Y − (zW0 −W1)Y 2)
w2 = W20(1 + z
2W0 −W1 + Y − (z2W0 −W1)Y 2)
This reduces our work to solving
θ(W10)
(
91z + 70 + (18z − 27)(zW0 −W1)
+ (8z + 23 + (−8z − 64)(zW0 −W1))Y
+ (96z + 52 + (−31z + 87)(zW0 −W1))Y 2
)





− 91z − 21 + (−18z − 45)(z2W0 −W1)
+ (−8z + 15 + (8z − 56)(z2W0 −W1))
+ (−96z − 44 + (31z − 79)(z2W0 −W1))Y 2
)
= W20(1 + z
2W0 −W1 + Y − (z2W0 −W1)Y 2)




where r0,1, r0,2 ∈ R0. Let








then we need only solve
W10r0,1
(
91z + 70 + (18z − 27)(zW0 −W1)
+ (8z + 23 + (−8z − 64)(zW0 −W1))Y
+ (96z + 52 + (−31z + 87)(zW0 −W1))Y 2
)





− 91z − 21 + (−18z − 45)(z2W0 −W1)
+ (−8z + 15 + (8z − 56)(z2W0 −W1))
+ (−96z − 44 + (31z − 79)(z2W0 −W1))Y 2
)
= W20(1 + z
2W0 −W1 + Y − (z2W0 −W1)Y 2)
for r0,1 and r0,2. Using Maple and Magma we find that
r0,1 = 84− 54z + (68z − 89)W0 + (77− 11z)W1
+ (5z + 33 + (25 + 36z)W0 + (31− 17z)W1)Y
+ (−15− 24z + (−45z + 15)W0 + (−8z + 49)W1)Y 2
r0,2 = −59 + 54z + (−68z + 40)W0 + (88 + 11z)W1
+ (−5z + 28 + (−11− 36z)W0 + (48 + 17z)W1)Y
+ (9 + 24z + (45z + 60)W0 + (8z + 57)W1)Y
2
Now we can define the following:
θ(W10) = W10r0,1
θ(W20) = W20r0,2
To break the system we need to find θ(e).
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To do this we break e into its R0, R1, and R2 parts and we get the following:
e0 = 21− 9W0 − 4W1 + (−15 + 3W0 + 36W1)Y + (30 + 56W0 + 53W1)Y 2
e1 = W10(−97z + 86 + (43z + 7)(zW0 −W1)
+ (−7z − 37 + (63z + 2)(zW0 −W1))Y
+ (−47z + 83 + (18z − 37)(zW0 −W1))Y 2)
e2 = W20(97z − 14− (43z + 36)(z2W0 −W1)
+ (7z − 30− (63z + 61)(z2W0 −W1))Y
+ (47z − 67 + (−18z − 55)(z2W0 −W1))Y 2).
So θ(e) reduces to
θ(e) = 21− 7X − 16X2 −X3 − 4X4 − 16X5 + 5X6
− 15Y − 4XY + 2X2Y + 25X3Y + 11X4Y + 43X5Y + 40X6Y
+ 30Y 2 + 61XY 2 + 46X2Y 2 + 67X3Y 2 + 61X4Y 2 + 46X5Y 2 + 46X6Y 2
Reducing this modulo p = 3 we get −X − X2 − X3 − X4 − X5 − X6 + (−X −
X2 +X3 −X4 +X5 +X6)Y + (X +X2 +X3 +X4 +X5 +X6)Y 2 which should
be ψ modulo p. Using this and h to compute m we get small
E − h ∗
(
−X −X2 −X3 −X4 −X5 −X6+
(−X −X2 +X3 −X4 +X5 +X6)Y + (X +X2 +X3 +X4 +X5 +X6)Y 2
)
≡− 5− 50X − 47X2 − 54X3 − 33X4 − 28X5 + 52X6
− 47Y + 77XY + 97X2Y − 12X3Y + 68X4Y − 29X5Y − 32X6Y
− 71Y 2 + 56XY 2 − 58X2Y 2 − 50X3Y 2 − 44X4Y 2 + 96X5Y 2 − 45X6Y 2
which is the message m.
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